When Pinocchio's nose does not grow:belief regarding lie-detectability modulates production of deception by Sip, Kamila E et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Pinocchio's nose does not grow
Citation for published version:
Sip, KE, Carmel, D, Marchant, JL, Li, J, Petrovic, P, Roepstorff, A, McGregor, WB & Frith, CD 2013, 'When
Pinocchio's nose does not grow: belief regarding lie-detectability modulates production of deception'
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol. 7, 16. DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00016
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00016
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Publisher Rights Statement:
This Document is Protected by copyright and was first published by Frontiers. All rights reserved. it is
reproduced with permission. © Sip, K. E., Carmel, D., Marchant, J. L., Li, J., Petrovic, P., Roepstorff, A.,
McGregor, W. B., & Frith, C. D. (2013). When Pinocchio's nose does not grow: belief regarding lie-detectability
modulates production of deception. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, [16]doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00016
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 04 February 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00016
When Pinocchio’s nose does not grow: belief regarding
lie-detectability modulates production of deception
Kamila E. Sip1,2,3*, David Carmel4, Jennifer L. Marchant5,6, Jian Li7, Predrag Petrovic8,
Andreas Roepstorff1,2, William B. McGregor2 and Christopher D. Frith1,6
1 Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Aarhus, Denmark
2 Department of Aesthetics and Communication - Linguistics, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
3 Department of Psychology, Rutgers University - Newark, NJ, USA
4 Department of Psychology, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
5 Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK
6 Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
7 Department of Psychology, IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research Peking University, Beijing, China
8 Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet Stockholm, A Medical University, Stockholm, Sweden
Edited by:
Matthias Gamer, University Medical
Center Hamburg-Eppendorf,
Germany
Reviewed by:
Thomas Baumgartner, University of
Basel, Switzerland
Nobuhito Abe, Kyoto University,
Japan
*Correspondence:
Kamila E. Sip, Social and Affective
Neuroscience Lab, Department of
Psychology, Rutgers University -
Newark, Smith Hall, Room 301,
101 Warren Street, Newark,
NJ 07102, USA.
e-mail: ksip@psychology.rutgers.edu
Does the brain activity underlying the production of deception differ depending on whether
or not one believes their deception can be detected? To address this question, we had
participants commit a mock theft in a laboratory setting, and then interrogated them
while they underwent functional MRI (fMRI) scanning. Crucially, during some parts of the
interrogation participants believed a lie-detector was activated, whereas in other parts they
were told it was switched-off. We were thus able to examine the neural activity associated
with the contrast between producing true vs. false claims, as well as the independent
contrast between believing that deception could and could not be detected. We found
increased activation in the right amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as the
left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), during the production of false (compared to true)
claims. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the effects of deception
and belief in the left temporal pole and right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, where
activity increased during the production of deception when participants believed their false
claims could be detected, but not when they believed the lie-detector was switched-off. As
these regions are associated with binding socially complex perceptual input and memory
retrieval, we conclude that producing deceptive behavior in a context in which one believes
this deception can be detected is associated with a cognitively taxing effort to reconcile
contradictions between one’s actions and recollections.
Keywords: mock-crime, deception, beliefs, lie-detection, fMRI
INTRODUCTION
Deception is inherently social. Deceptive behavior involves not
only the creation of a representation that is at odds with physi-
cal reality, but also the manipulation of another person’s beliefs
in a particular context (Sip et al., 2008a). This, in turn, means
that deceivers must hold a belief about whether their deception
is likely to be detected because a high likelihood of detection
may lead to anxiety, altering the deceiver’s emotional state and
arousal level. Although several recent studies have attempted to
elucidate the neural underpinnings of producing (e.g., Abe et al.,
2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Kozel et al., 2009; Sip et al., 2010)
and detecting (Grèzes et al., 2004, 2006) deceptive behavior, the
role of beliefs about the detectability of deception remains poorly
understood.
Behavioral research has shown that neither deceivers nor
truthful people respond in the same way to all situations, as
their behavior depends on their emotional state (Ekman and
Friesen, 1969; Ekman, 1992), the complexity of what is said (Vrij,
2000; Vrij et al., 2001), and their need to control the impression
they make on others (Vrij, 1993). From a behavioral standpoint,
therefore, there is no diagnostic cue that serves as a unique indi-
cation of deception (Vrij, 2004; Vrij et al., 2007; Vrij, 2008).
This may be due to the complex nature of the demands that
deceptive behavior places on the deceiver: it requires a series
of conjectures about the deceived person’s knowledge, the gap
between this knowledge and the truth, the feasible manipula-
tions this gap leaves room for, and the chances of getting caught.
Deception is thus a sophisticated activity, involving a host of
cognitive processes including memory, reasoning, and theory of
mind. Furthermore, producing deception is emotionally taxing,
and causes anxiety and physiological arousal that require effortful
self-regulation (e.g., Abe et al., 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009).
The multi-faceted act of attempting to deceive is therefore
likely to require the concerted activity of several neural mecha-
nisms, with activity in different, widely distributed brain regions
mediating the various processes underlying deceptive behavior.
Recently, a great deal of interest has centered on neuroimag-
ing to test whether this technology could prove to be a useful
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and reliable tool for lie-detection [for review see Greely and
Illes (2007); Sip et al. (2008a,b)]. Several physiological (e.g.,
Bell et al., 2008; Gamer et al., 2010, 2012) and functional MRI
(fMRI) studies (see e.g., Kozel et al., 2005, 2009; Mohamed
et al., 2006) of mock-crimes have investigated the neural corre-
lates of information inhibition and suppression that are associ-
ated with deceptive behavior. This previous research, however,
has focused almost entirely on comparing deceptive vs. truthful
behavior, neglecting the potential effects of participants’ belief
in the efficacy of lie-detection, and how such belief may mod-
ulate the neural activity underlying deception. Peoples’ beliefs
about whether or not their deception can be detected may affect
activity in all brain regions that are involved in the production
of this behavior. Alternatively, such belief may only modulate
activity in a subset of these regions—for example, the belief
that deception may be detected might alter activity in regions
whose activity mediates the emotional aspects of deceptive behav-
ior, but not those mediating aspects related to memory and
reasoning. Clarifying this issue has both theoretical implica-
tions for understanding the systems underlying deception, and
practical implications for the use of neuroimaging in forensic
contexts.
In the current study we used a mock-theft paradigm to inves-
tigate whether people’s beliefs about lie-detectability affect the
brain activity that underlies the production of deception. Instead
of focusing primarily on comparing the neural activity evoked
by participants’ false and true claims, we investigated whether
people’s beliefs regarding whether or not their false responses
can be detected affect the brain activity underlying the produc-
tion of these responses. By analogy to the well-known story of
Pinocchio’s growing nose, we asked: would Pinocchio’s nose only
grow when he believed his lies could be detected?
Subjective beliefs about the world and other people under-
lie most social and socio-economic decisions (e.g., Frith and
Frith, 2003). Specifically, our beliefs and expectations modu-
late our emotional and physiological states, the way we interact
with others, and how we make and evaluate choices (e.g., Pollina
et al., 2004; Petrovic et al., 2005; De Martino et al., 2006; Mobbs
et al., 2006; Sip et al., 2010, 2012). Deception is an instance of
belief manipulation, and is likely to rely on the deceiver’s own
beliefs.
Previous studies of deception have found increased activation
in the amygdala—a region known to be involved in the pro-
cessing of emotional information—when participants produce
(Abe et al., 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009) and detect decep-
tion (Grèzes et al., 2004, 2006). Additionally, several other regions
known to mediate cognitive processes involving memory and rea-
soning, such as the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the anterior and
posterior cingulate cortex (ACC, PCC, respectively) have been
associated with producing false responses (e.g., Spence et al.,
2001; Ganis et al., 2003; Langleben et al., 2005; Nuñez et al., 2005;
Gamer et al., 2007; Sip et al., 2012). The amygdala, in particular,
seems to be a likely candidate for modulation by production of
deception and belief due to its central role in emotional process-
ing and its ubiquitous involvement in belief-related tasks (Grèzes
et al., 2004, 2006; Abe et al., 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009).
Grèzes et al. (2004, 2006) conducted two studies on non-verbal
deception in which participants either judged whether a third
party deceived them (2004), or witnessed deception which they
were not the target of themselves (2006). Increased activation in
the amygdala was found in both studies only when participants
detected that they were being deceived by a third party. More
recently, other groups found amygdala activation to be associ-
ated with breaking a previously made promise (Abe et al., 2007;
Baumgartner et al., 2009). Taken together, these studies suggest
that the amygdala plays an important role in processing decep-
tion, regardless of whether one is personally engaged in producing
it or is a target of deceit.
Inhibiting a choice of a risky option has been shown to be asso-
ciated with risk evaluation and risk aversion in cases where no
deception was involved (Aron et al., 2004; Christopoulos et al.,
2009). The IFG has been implicated in production of decep-
tion where participants needed to inhibit their true responses
(Langleben et al., 2005; Gamer et al., 2007). In a recent study by
Sip et al. (2012), activation in the right IFG was observed when
participants were deciding whether or not to produce a false-
hood. This activation occurred regardless of which response, true
or false, was made, which suggests that the IFG integrates con-
textual information about a risky choice rather than the value of
a claim itself. It remains unknown, however, whether this region
mediates any belief-related activity.
Here, we had participants commit a mock-crime (stealing a
gadget they were motivated to keep) and then undergo a realistic
interrogation, designed to induce increased anxiety, while under-
going fMRI scanning. Importantly, we manipulated their belief
about the detectability of their deception by notifying them that
a (fictitious) lie-detector was either active or inactive during dif-
ferent parts of the interrogation. We expected this manipulation
to modulate activity in the network of brain regions previously
associated with producing deception—the amygdala, IFG, ACC,
and PCC. Our main goal was to find out whether belief would
alter activity in all these areas, only some of them, or an entirely
separate set of neural regions.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Nineteenth healthy, right-handed participants with no reported
neurological or psychiatric disorders, and from diverse social and
professional backgrounds, took part in the experiment. Data from
two participants were removed from the analysis. One admit-
ted to stealing an object in the first few questions; the other fell
asleep during the functional scans. The remaining 17 participants
(7 females) were between 20 and 45 years old. Participants gave
written informed consent to take part in the study, which was
approved by the Joint Ethics Committee of the National Hospital
for Neurology and Neuroscience (UCL NHS Trust) and Institute
of Neurology (UCL).
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE
Upon arrival at the laboratory, each participant was given both
written and verbal instructions. Participants were told that they
would steal an item and that afterwards, as they were interro-
gated in the scanner while connected to a lie-detector, their brain
activity would be monitored. Unknown to the participants, the
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“lie-detector” was not real, and comprised two mock electrodes
and a finger grip to imitate a polygraph test.
Two rooms were used in the mock-theft stage. The rooms were
marked “red” and “blue” by pieces of appropriately colored paper
placed on the inside and outside of each door. Each room con-
tained typical office furniture and items, among which were a pair
of earphones and a USB memory stick. The earphones and mem-
ory sticks were placed out of immediate view, in specific locations
known to the researchers.
Each participant was escorted by the experimenter (author
KES) to the corridor outside the red and blue rooms. Participants
were informed that they had the right to refrain from taking part
in the study, if it conflicted with their morals, and they would still
be paid for participation. No participant took this option.
The participants were asked to enter each room and search it
carefully in order to locate the earphones and the USB memory
stick. They were asked to select one room and “steal” a single
object from it. Participants could enter the rooms as many times
as they wanted, but were asked to go into each room at least once
in order to become familiar with both rooms and locate all the
objects. After taking an object, they put it into an opaque bag pro-
vided by the experimenter, and hid it in a locker before going into
the scanner.
In the scanner control room, the participant met the inter-
rogator, who was introduced as an expert in the field of criminal
investigation, with a specialty in polygraph tests (the interroga-
tor was actually either author DC or PP, who are not, in fact,
such specialists; one was assigned to each participant randomly).
Before entering the control room they were told the interrogator
did not know whether or not they had stolen anything, but only
that they had been inside both rooms and had searched them.
They were also told that if, by the end of the interrogation, the
interrogator could not tell whether they had taken an object, then
they would get to keep the object they took (in fact, the interroga-
tors were aware that all participants had taken an object, and half
of the participants were selected at random and allowed to keep
the stolen object). The interrogator explained the procedure of
the interrogation, and presented the equipment that would osten-
sibly be used to measure skin conductance responses (or GSR,
for galvanic skin responses, the acronym used during the inter-
rogation). To illustrate “typical” skin conductance readings, the
interrogator presented computer-generated graphs to the partic-
ipants. These graphs were unrelated to real polygraph readings;
one showed a relatively smooth line and, according to the inter-
rogator, indicated “telling the truth,” while the other was very
spiky and indicated “lying.” The aim of this presentation was
to persuade the participants that the lie-detection device works
reliably.
Participants were told that the “lie-detector” would enable
the interrogator to discriminate between honest and deceptive
responses. However, it would only be turned on for half the time
during each scanning session, and they would be informed when
this was happening.
The questions used during scanning were pre-recorded and
played in a randomized order. Pre-recorded comments, such as
“I see you’re finding this difficult,” were also used to maintain
a realistic atmosphere. Depending on its content, each question
was accompanied by a picture of either the red or blue room, or
by a picture of one of the objects on an appropriately colored
background (see Figure 1). Participants were asked to answer
the questions by pressing keys marked yes/no on a response
pad (two-specific keys on a four-key pad), as well as to mouth
their response with a pre-specified noise—[mm]/mm/for “no”
and [mhm]/mhm/for “yes”—to verify they were attending to
FIGURE 1 | A schematic example of the stimulus display. At the
beginning of each block participants were told that the lie-detector
(represented by the acronym GSR, for galvanic skin response) was either
on or off. During the interrogation, pre-recorded auditory questions were
read out over earphones, accompanied by appropriate visual presentations
(question presentation took 2–4 s). After the question was completed,
a response cue appeared on the screen for 2 s, during which participants
had to provide a response. The response cue (0–2 s) was randomly
assigned on each trial (Y/N or N/Y) to prevent participants from pressing
only one button as a default response. Participants’ response (which could
be either “yes,” “no,” “no response” if no response was given within the
allotted time or “wrong button” if a button without an assigned meaning
was pressed) was displayed on the screen for the duration of the 5–8 s
inter-trial interval (ITI).
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the task. Participants were informed both auditory and with
written text each time the “lie-detector” was supposedly turned
on or off.
Participants were not explicitly instructed to produce false
statements, but merely motivated to try and keep the object they
took. The questions used during the interrogation fell into several
categories. A set of 12 personal questions, such as “Is your name
John?” or “Are you British?” was used to acquaint participants
with the procedure; they were told that such questions were used
to establish a “baseline” for their skin conductance responses. A
further set of 11 general questions allowed true responses to non-
incriminating aspects of participants’ behavior, e.g., “Did you go
into the Red-room?” which would always elicit a true response of
“yes,” because all the participants were asked to perform the same
set of actions. Together, the personal and general questions helped
establish a realistic atmosphere.
The crucial part of the interrogation consisted of 35 theft-
related questions, divided between truth- and falsehood-eliciting
based on each participant’s choice of stolen object: (1) theft-
related falsehood-eliciting questions (14 related to the theft of an
object that the participant actually took); and (2) 21 theft-related
truth-eliciting questions (related to the theft of an object that the
participant did not take). The nature of a specific theft-related
question (truth- or falsehood-eliciting), as well as the number of
questions of each type, was determined by context. For example,
a question such as “Did you take earphones from the Red-Room?”
would be a theft-related falsehood-eliciting question, to which the
participant would respond “no,” if they took the object from that
room. The same question would be a theft-related truth-eliciting
question (again evoking the response “no”), if the participant
took the earphones from the other room. The experiment thus
had a 2 (belief: lie-detector on, lie-detector off) × 2 (behavior:
true, false) factorial design. Each participant was scanned twice,
with each of the two scanning sessions divided into one half with
the lie-detector “on” and the other with the lie-detector “off.” The
order of the “on” and “off” conditions was randomly assigned and
counterbalanced across participants.
An eye-tracker (ASL E-5000) was used to make sure partici-
pants did not fall asleep or close their eyes to avoid looking at the
visual stimuli. The participants used a plastic box with four push
buttons to register their responses.
In a written post-scan questionnaire, participants rated emo-
tions they may have experienced during the interrogation (e.g.,
upset, anxious, nervous); whether they felt guilty about stealing
the object in question; their confidence in getting away with lying
(and whether this differed when the lie-detector was active or
not), and their motivation to keep the stolen object. Participants
responded using a 0–5 scale where 0 means “not at all” and 5
means “a lot.” Additionally, participants were asked whether they
had tried to use any strategy to deceive the interrogator, and if
they had, to describe this strategy.
fMRI SCANNING AND PREPROCESSING
A 1.5 Tesla Siemens Sonata MRI scanner (Siemens, Erlangen,
Germany) was used to acquire T1-weighted anatomical images
and T2∗-weighted echo-planar functional images with blood
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (35 axial slices,
2mm slice thickness with 1mm gap, 3 × 3 resolution in
plane, slice TE = 50ms, volume TR = 3.15 s, 64 × 64 matrix,
192 × 192mm FOV, 90◦ flip angle). During two functional EPI
sessions, an average of 221 whole brain volumes (range 214–225
depending on participants’ response speed) were acquired. The
first 4 volumes were discarded to allow for T1 contrast to reach
equilibrium.
Image processing was carried out using SPM8 (Statistical
Parametric Mapping software, Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging, UCL; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented
in MATLAB (The Mathworks Inc., Massachusetts, USA;
www.mathworks.com). EPI images were realigned to correct
for movements by aligning the functional (T2∗-weighted EPI)
images of each run to the first volume using a six-parameter rigid
body transformation. Mean functional images were then coregis-
tered to the T1-weighted anatomical image and normalized into
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template space using a
12-parameter affine transformation (parameters were estimated
from segmentation and normalization of anatomical images to
MNI template using SPM8). Normalized functional images were
resampled into 2 × 2 × 2 voxel resolution. A Gaussian kernel
with a full width at half maximum of 6mm was applied for
spatial smoothing.
fMRI ANALYSIS
In a statistical model that included all events in the scanning
run, each event was convolved with the standard haemodynamic
response function of SPM8 (Holmes and Friston, 1998). The
design matrix comprised a column for each experimental con-
dition, with separate events defined by their onset time and
duration (based on participants’ response times). The fit to the
data was estimated for each participant using a general linear
model (Friston et al., 1995) with a 128 s high-pass filter, global
scaling, and modeling of serial autocorrelations.
Individual T-contrasts related to the different conditions
within a factorial design comprising the conditions of interest
(2 factors: lie-detector on vs. off, and true vs. false response) were
created from the parameter estimates (beta weights). T-contrasts
were computed within subjects for the main effects and interac-
tion between belief about whether the lie-detection device was
active and the type of response (true or false) to theft-related
questions. These were then used in separate second level ran-
dom effects analyses in order to facilitate inferences about group
effects (Friston et al., 1995). Results are reported for clusters with
at least 10 voxels and a significance threshold of p < 0.001 (uncor-
rected for multiple comparisons; Wager et al., 2007). Missed trials
were modeled by a regressor of no interest in the GLM analy-
sis. All brain loci are reported in MNI coordinates. Anatomical
loci were determined using the Wake Forest University PicAtlas
and were double checked against the Harvard-Oxford proba-
bilistic atlas using a 50% probability threshold (Desikan et al.,
2006).
RESULTS
DEBRIEFING
All participants claimed to have been highly motivated to keep
the object they took. Interestingly, 14 of the 17 participants chose
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to take the memory stick rather than the earphones, claiming in
debriefing that they found it more appealing; the fact that the
choice was not random confirms that the task was engaging and
personally relevant.
Eight of the 17 participants reported that they had tried to
use strategies to avoid detection. Strategies included attempting
to control their breathing, focusing on something else, silently
repeating in their heads I didn’t steal anything, or trying to prolong
their response times when giving truthful answers in an attempt
to confuse the interrogator (e.g., one participant said “I would
delay giving a response when asked about the object I didn’t steal
to create confusion”).
All the participants reported that they found the interrogation
realistic (i.e., none of them suspected that the questions they were
asked were actually pre-recorded), though unsurprisingly, some
of them noted that they would have been more nervous if the
interrogation had not taken place in the context of an experiment.
The majority of the participants (12 out of 17) reported that they
found it easier to lie when they were told that the lie-detector was
inactive.
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
To examine whether the belief that a “lie-detector” was active
affected participants’ production of deceptive responses, we
examined reaction time (RT) data (Nuñez et al., 2005; Abe
et al., 2007; Kozel et al., 2009). RTs were calculated as the
duration from the end of a question to the participant’s but-
ton response. A 2 (belief: “lie-detector” on, “lie-detector”
off) × 2 (question type: theft-related truth-eliciting, theft-
related falsehood-eliciting) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed
no main effects [belief: F(1, 16) = 0.169, p = 0.69; question
type: F(1, 16) = 0.00, p = 0.97], and no interaction between
belief and question type [F(1, 16) = 2.381, p = 0.142; see
Figure 2]. The similarity between the RTs evoked by ques-
tions in the different conditions calls into question previous
FIGURE 2 | Mean RT under the different conditions. Separate means are
given for false, true and general responses with the lie-detector “on” and
“off”. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. Participants’
responses were slower for general questions than for theft-related
questions. RTs to truth- and falsehood-eliciting theft-related questions did
not differ, and RTs were not modulated by whether the lie-detector was
“on” or “off.”
reports (e.g., Nuñez et al., 2005; Abe et al., 2007; Kozel et al., 2009),
which suggested that RTs could be used to distinguish deceptive
and truthful behavior (but see the Discussion, where we note the
limitations of using RTs in the present context).
Interestingly, examination of the general questions indicated
that they evoked longer RTs than theft-related ones. Indeed,
including them in the statistical analysis, by running a 2 (belief:
“Lie-detector” on, “Lie-detector” off) × 3 (question type: theft-
related truth-eliciting, theft-related falsehood-eliciting, general
truth-eliciting) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect
of question type [F(2, 32) = 10.1, p < 0.05], but no main effect
of belief [F(1, 16) = 0.71, p = 0.41] nor an interaction between
belief and question type [F(2, 32) = 1.78, p = 0.19] (Figure 2). To
investigate the main effect further, post-hoc paired t-tests [cor-
rected for multiple comparisons using the sequential Bonferroni
method (Holm, 1979; Rice, 1989) and collapsed across the belief
conditions, as there was no main effect of belief] were con-
ducted. The tests indicated that participants’ responses to general
questions were slower than to either the theft-related falsehood-
eliciting [t(16) = 3.45, p < 0.05] or theft-related truth-eliciting
questions [t(16) = 3.31, p < 0.05]. RTs to theft-related truth-
eliciting and theft-related falsehood-eliciting questions did not
differ [t(16) = 0.02, p = 0.99]. These findings suggest that the
increased arousal caused by being asked theft-related questions
may have increased the speed with which participants responded
to such questions, but the specific content of the questions—
whether or not they referred to the object the participant had
stolen—did not modulate response times. A different possibil-
ity that must be acknowledged is that the pre-recorded theft-
related questions were easier to discern while they were still
being read out, leading to uniformly faster responses than general
questions did.
Three participants explicitly stated in the post-scan question-
naire that they tried to slow their truthful responses in order to
mislead the interrogator. However, the behavioral data show that
although these three participants made slower responses over-
all, the patterns of their RTs did not differ from the rest of the
group. Despite their claims, their response times were actually
slightly faster for true compared to false claims. Excluding these
participants did not alter the pattern or significance of any of the
analyses reported.
Participants missed an average of 3.62 trials (SD = 4.1) out
of a total of 104 trials. One participant missed 14 trials and was
the only outlier in terms of missed responses (>3 standard devi-
ations from the mean). This participant’s behavioral responses
were otherwise within 3 standard deviations from the mean on all
measures, and excluding this participant did not alter the pattern
or significance of any of the analyses reported.
IMAGING RESULTS
To examine the effect of belief on the brain activity underly-
ing the production of deception, we examined BOLD responses
evoked by questions in a factorial design with the factors belief
(lie-detector on or off) and behavior (true or false responses).
Investigations comparing the neural activity associated with
true and false responses have been carried out before, and
we expected to find increased activation for false (compared
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to true) responses in similar regions to those found in those
previous studies (Ganis et al., 2003; Langleben et al., 2005;
Abe et al., 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Kozel et al., 2009;
Sip et al., 2012): amygdala, IFG, and PCC. Our main ques-
tion, however, was whether the difference between the neural
activation evoked by false and true responses would be mod-
ulated by participants’ beliefs about whether their deception
could be detected, and whether such modulation would occur
in all or only in a subset of the regions that process deception
production.
Significantly activated regions identified in the second level
analysis are detailed in Table 1. The tests revealed a main effect of
response type, whereby producing deceptive responses was asso-
ciated with higher BOLD activation, in the right amygdala and
IFG, and in the left PCC (Figure 3). There were no regions in
which a main effect in the opposite direction (true > false) was
observed, and no regions showed a main effect of belief in either
direction (lie-detector on> off or off> on).
In addition to the main effects reported above, we found a sig-
nificant interaction between belief and behavior in two regions:
the right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus (Figures 4A,B)
and the left temporal pole (Figures 4C,D), regions that have both
been previously associated with social processes such as theory
of mind and face recognition (Olson et al., 2007), and decep-
tive decision-making (Ganis et al., 2003; Mohamed et al., 2006).
Examination of the patterns of responses in these regions reveals
that the interaction was due to greater activation when producing
deceptive, compared to truthful, responses when the lie-detector
was believed to be on, and a reversed pattern when the lie-detector
was believed to be off.
To further investigate the effects underlying the interaction, we
analyzed the BOLD responses associated with the simple effects of
deceptive vs. truthful responses in each belief condition. For the
right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, we found that when
participants believed the lie-detector was on, activation when
producing deceptive responses was significantly greater than
when producing truthful responses [t(16) = 5.397, p < 0.001].
However, when the lie-detector was believed to be off both kinds
of response were reduced and were not significantly different
from each other [t(16) = 1.6, p = 0.14]. Belief that lies could be
detected thus led to differential responses in this region. For the
left temporal pole, there was again significantly greater activation
when producing deceptive (compared to truthful) responses in
the “lie-detector on” condition [t(16) = 2.54, p < 0.05]. However,
this difference was reversed in the “lie-detector off” condition,
in which truthful responses led to significantly greater responses
than deceptive responses [t(16) = 3.643, p < 0.01].
DISCUSSION
We conducted an fMRI investigation to test whether beliefs
about how detectable deception was would affect the neural
activity involved in producing it. Specifically, we studied the
effect of a belief that a lie-detector was on or off on the neu-
ral processing underlying deception. Our results show that a
belief in the assumed efficacy of lie-detection does indeed mod-
ulate the neural activity in a subset of the regions—the right
hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus and left temporal pole—
involved in producing false claims, such that false responses led
to greater activity than true responses when participants believed
lie-detector was inactive. This difference was not present (and in
the left temporal pole was reversed) when the lie-detector was
believed to be off. Other regions—right amygdala, right IFG, and
left PCC—were more active when producing a false claim, but
this difference was not modulated by belief in lie-detectability.
Replicating our previous findings (Sip et al., 2010, 2012),
our behavioral results showed that in an ecologically valid sce-
nario there was no difference in RTs for producing true and
false statements in a context in which both can be used decep-
tively. These findings are at odds with other deception stud-
ies which have found faster responses when participants were
being truthful, compared to when they were producing a false
claim (e.g., Kozel et al., 2005; Langleben et al., 2005; Spence
et al., 2008; Seymour and Fraynt, 2009). This discrepancy, how-
ever, might stem from the realistic experimental paradigm we
employed, which may have encouraged some of the participants
to attempt to use strategies that would mislead the interroga-
tor. Indeed, during debriefing we learned that some participants
had tried to use response timing as a countermeasure to detec-
tion. This suggests that people produce deception in various
ways if they are allowed to use their own deceptive strategy.
However, it must also be noted that in the current study, we
used auditory questions combined with visual presentation of
relevant items. The visual stimuli may have interfered with audi-
tory processing, or facilitated response preparation such that
Table 1 | Brain regions showing activation during response production.
Brain region Hemisphere x y z t-value Cluster size
MAIN EFFECT OF RESPONSE (FALSE > TRUE)
Amygdala R 30 0 −24 6.98 17
Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) R 44 26 10 6.24 25
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) L −2 −12 50 4.83 10
INTERACTION (ON FALSE-TRUE > OFF FALSE-TRUE)
Hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus R 36 −18 −18 4.98 26
Temporal pole L −44 14 −22 4.89 17
Peak activation coordinates in standard MNI space and their associated t-scores. Regions shown were significantly activated at a threshold of p< 0.001 (uncorrected)
with a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels.
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FIGURE 3 | The main effect of response (false > true). Panels on the left
show the activation cluster and panels on the right show mean parameter
estimates in the activation cluster in the right amygdala (A and B), right IFG
(C and D), and left PCC (E and F). Deceptive responses in these regions
yielded higher BOLD activation than truthful ones, and this difference was not
significantly modulated by belief about whether the lie detector was on or off.
participants could have decided what response to provide before
the question was fully articulated. However, the actual response
could only be provided after the question was posed, so cal-
culating RTs as the elapsed time from the end of the question
was the only way to avoid additional assumptions regarding
the point in time at which participants decided what answer to
give. This calculation also avoided false-positive difference in RTs
that might be caused by differences in the lengths of the posed
questions.
Our neuroimaging results demonstrate that the assumption
that the same brain regions would always be either active or inac-
tive when one tells a lie or the truth, respectively (Mohamed
et al., 2006) is an oversimplification. Neural activity in various
regions, including the ACC, DLPFC, IFG, the caudate nucleus,
and the amygdala (e.g., Kozel et al., 2005; Baumgartner et al.,
2009; Greene and Paxton, 2009; Sip et al., 2010, 2012; Gamer
et al., 2012) has been implicated in the production of decep-
tion. The present findings involve a smaller set of areas than
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FIGURE 4 | The interaction between response type (true or false) and
belief about the lie-detector (on or off). Panels on the left show the
activation cluster and panels on the right show parameter estimates in the
activation cluster in the right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus (A and B)
and left temporal pole (C and D). In these loci, the difference between the
BOLD activation caused by false vs. true responses was abolished (and for
the hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, reversed) when participants
believed the lie detector was off.
reported in previous neuroimaging studies of deception [for a
review see Sip et al. (2008a)]. Unlike these previous studies, we did
not observe activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
ACC, or the caudate nucleus. The fact that we found activa-
tion in a smaller set of regions than previously reported could
be due to several factors that are not substantive to the issue of
deception, such as the specific statistical model and significance
thresholds employed in different studies, specific characteristics
of the participant cohort, or the visual and auditory stimuli used
in the course of the interrogation. We speculate, however, that
a substantive factor—the realistic nature of the mock-theft sce-
nario used in the present study—might also potentially be at
play. Such scenarios have been shown previously to reduce par-
ticipants’ physiological arousal (indicated by skin conductance)
during interrogation, compared to more standard experimental
procedures (though it must be noted that this was observed in
the context of a different method for lie-detection, and may have
been modulated by reduced memory for crime-related items;
Carmel et al., 2003). Although negative findings (the absence of
activation in particular brain regions) must always be interpreted
with extreme caution, further work may benefit from attempting
to address the relation between how realistic a mock-crime sce-
nario is and how widespread neural activation across the brain is
during interrogation.
MAIN EFFECTS: DECEPTIVE vs. TRUTHFUL RESPONSES
Deceptive responses produced greater BOLD responses than
truthful responses, regardless of the belief condition, in three
regions: the right amygdala, right IFG, and left PCC. The amyg-
dala and IFG have been implicated in recent ecologically valid
examinations of deception (Abe et al., 2007; Baumgartner et al.,
2009; Sip et al., 2012). Here, the observed activation in the
amygdala, which is known to be involved in processing emotion-
ally relevant information [for a review see Dolan (2007); Olson
et al. (2007)], suggests that participants experienced an emo-
tional conflict resulting from making false claims while risking
a potential confrontation, and that this occurred regardless the
believed status of the lie-detector device. Abe et al. (2007) were the
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first to report amygdala involvement in producing verbal decep-
tion, employing a realistic scenario in which participants under-
went interrogation. They speculated that emotional processing,
reflected in the increased amygdala activation they observed, was
associated with attempts to deceive the interrogator. In a dif-
ferent study, Baumgartner et al. (2009) showed that breaking a
previously expressed promise and consequently deceiving oth-
ers in a social context appears to create anxiety associated with
social consequences of the act rather than with producing false
claims per se.
In previous studies, the PCC has been implicated in process-
ing the emotional aspects of context and in integrating emotion-
and memory-related processes (Mohamed et al., 2006). Here we
observe increased activation for producing false vs. true claims,
suggesting that the cognitive load associated with deception
places demands on emotional processing. This specific process-
ing, however, was not modulated by belief in lie-detectability,
indicating that it is largely independent of those processes that
mediate the emotion and anxiety engendered by the context of
such belief. Previous studies have also shown right IFG involve-
ment in deception (Gamer et al., 2007; Sip et al., 2012) as well
as in response inhibition (Aron et al., 2004) and risk aversion
(Christopoulos et al., 2009). Interestingly, right IFG was previ-
ously involved in production of deceptive responses in a social
context where participants had to first comprehend the ques-
tion, and then choose to whether to inhibit a true response
and claim falsehood instead (Sip et al., 2012). The present find-
ings thus suggest that the right IFG plays a generalized role in
deception that is related to monitoring response release, and
that this process is unlikely to be modulated by belief about
lie-detectability.
INTERACTION OF DECEPTIVE/TRUTHFUL RESPONSE AND BELIEF
ABOUT LIE-DETECTABILITY
We found two regions, the right hippocampus/parahippocampal
gyrus and left temporal pole, in which response and belief
interacted significantly to produce greater BOLD activation for
deceptive responses when the lie-detector was believed to be on,
but not when it was believed to be off. The temporal pole has
been implicated in various socio-emotional processes involved in
broadly construed theory of mind (Carr et al., 2003; Frith and
Frith, 2003; Völlm et al., 2006), moral judgments (Moll et al.,
2002; Heekeren et al., 2003), and deception detection (Grèzes
et al., 2004, 2006). Olson et al. (2007) suggested that this region
thus combines emotional responses with highly processed sen-
sory stimuli. In our study, the increased temporal pole activity
we observed when the lie-detector was “on” may be due to par-
ticipants attempting not only to regulate their own emotional
responses but also to infer the emotional states and beliefs of
their interrogator. The realistic interrogation scenario, involving
an ostensible “real-life interrogator,” may have increased partic-
ipants’ anxiety and contributed to the modulation found in the
activity of this region (which is known to have reciprocal anatom-
ical connections to the amygdala; Dolan, 2007; Olson et al.,
2007). The pattern of responses in the temporal pole was reversed
in the “lie-detector off” condition, in which truthful responses
led to greater activation than deceptive ones. The functional
significance of this reversal remains unclear and requires further
elucidation.
We also observed a differential activation pattern in the right
hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, where BOLD activity dif-
fered for deceptive and truthful responses (and was greater for
deceptive ones), but only when the lie-detector was believed
to be on. We had not originally included these areas amongst
those in which we expected to find differential activation—
although the hippocampus has been previously associated with
producing deceptive response (Mohamed et al., 2006), and the
parahippocampal gyrus has been associated with reporting auto-
biographical memories (which participants must draw on to
produce truthful and deceptive responses; Ganis et al., 2003), nei-
ther region has been reported as consistently as other regions
in the context of deception [for an overview, see e.g., Sip et al.
(2008a)]. The differential activation we find here suggests that
these areas may play a role related to belief, which had not
been tapped into by previous studies where this factor was not
manipulated.
The hippocampus is known to play a central role in memory
(e.g., Burgess et al., 2002) as well as predictions about upcoming
events related to past experiences [for a review see e.g., Buckner
(2010)]. A previous investigation of neural connectivity (Smith
et al., 2006) has shown that not only the content of a memory but
also the context inwhich amemory was created have ameasurable
impact on episodic retrieval and interpersonal communication.
It is thus noteworthy that the cluster of activation that included
the hippocampus also extended to the parahippocampal gyrus.
In a social context the parahippocampal gyrus (as well as tempo-
ral pole) allows for a proper identification of communicational
intent, as demonstrated in a previous study of sarcasm (Rankin
et al., 2009). A seemingly insincere communication, such as sar-
casm, shares certain characteristics with deception, as in both
the communicated content is at odds with reality. However, in
contrast to deception, sarcasm lacks the deceptive intent; listener
is meant to realize the true meaning of what is communicated.
Importantly, to distinguish sarcasm from deception, one needs to
identify the meaning based on contextual cues. Similarly, in the
current study, participants interacted with another person and
based on prosody cues obtained from the interrogator, had to
monitor whether their denial of an action they did remember per-
forming (e.g., stealing a pair of ear phones) could be successful.
Their belief regarding whether the lie-detector is active was thus
directly relevant to this process of inference. The right parahip-
pocampal gyrus may therefore perform a similar role, mediating
social interaction, and its underlying intent, in both the con-
textualized production of deception of the present study and in
processing sarcasm (Rankin et al., 2009).
Emotionally charged experiences involve the hippocampus,
parahippocampal gyrus, and amygdala in the process of encod-
ing and consolidating these events into memories (Richter-Levin
and Akirav, 2001). The hippocampus is known to play a crucial
role in associative learning, as well as encoding and representing
the value of reward (e.g., Richter-Levin and Akirav, 2001; Smith
et al., 2006; Wimmer and Shohamy, 2012). Recently, Wimmer
and Shohamy (2012) offered novel neural evidence indicating
that the hippocampus may play an important role in value-based
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decision-making. They showed that the hippocampus not only
encodes reward value but also spreads it across items that were
not previously considered rewarding. In light of the present find-
ings, we propose that the neural connectivity between the hip-
pocampus/parahippocampal gyrus and amygdala (Phelps, 2004;
Smith et al., 2006) may facilitate a similar role for the hip-
pocampus/parahippocampal gyrus in context-dependent social
interactions, where social value must be flexibly assigned.
Interestingly, although activity in the amygdala was signifi-
cantly modulated by response (deceptive vs. truthful), this mod-
ulation did not interact with belief about the status of the
lie-detector. Our original hypothesis that the amygdala would
be a prime candidate for belief-related modulation was therefore
not borne out. Importantly, previous studies reporting deception-
related amygdala activation (Abe et al., 2007; Baumgartner et al.,
2009) did not have the immediate confrontation element that
was present in the interrogation scenario of the current study.
The absence of a significant interaction in the amygdala could
thus be due either to belief modulating other functions than the
emotional processes associated with amygdala activity, or to a ceil-
ing effect—the interrogation context may have been sufficient to
induce differential deception-related activity regardless of belief
about lie-detectability.
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, our findings suggest that belief in lie-detection efficacy
modulates a subset of the processes involved in producing decep-
tion. Cognitive processes involving reasoning and theory of mind,
mediated by the IFG and PCC, as well as emotional processes
mediated by the amygdala, are involved in the production of
deception—but the absence of modulation by belief in these
regions suggests that the processes they mediate are function-
ally separate from those involving belief. However, belief about
the detectability of lies does modulate activity in the tempo-
ral pole and hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, suggesting
that the social context and memory-related processing known to
be mediated by these regions are the aspects of deception that
are affected by belief. We, therefore, conclude that belief in the
efficacy of a lie-detection device matters, emphasizing the impor-
tance of such beliefs in both basic research and applied (forensic)
settings.
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